This paper analyzes the political processes in which the flexicurity policy regimes in Danish and Dutch labor markets have been formulated, in the viewpoint of linking coalition politics to social concertation. The countries' cross-bloc coalition politics has been the political configuration representing labor and employers equitably, thus having worked as the institutional incentives inducing social concertation which is the mechanism of political exchange between flexibility policies and security policies. There also existed the differences between the political processes of the two countries' flexicurity politics. The Danish flexicurity politics has been characterized by linking ideologically unconnected minority coalition to unstable social concertation, while the Dutch one has been so by linking cross-bloc majority or oversized coalition politics to stable social concertation. This divergent linkage pattern between coalition politics and social concertaion should be regarded as the variable making the flexicurity policy regimes in two countries' labor markets differentiated. The analysis outcome provides us with a political economical implication, that is, cross-bloc majority or oversized coalition politics is more instrumental political precondition than intra-bloc minority coalition politics, in formulating and institutionalizing a balanced flexicurity policy regimes by facilitating social concertation. The dynamics of flexicurity politics in Danish and Dutch labor markets helps search for the way how consensual mechanism coordinating the Korean labor market politically has to be designed.